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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
 
 Marcal Fraction, a prisoner confined at FCI-Allenwood, appeals pro se from an 
order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying 
his motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).  The 
Government has filed a motion for summary affirmance.  For the following reasons, we 
grant the Government’s motion and will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
 In February 2017, Fraction pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute cocaine.  See 
21 U.S.C. § 846.  As a career offender previously convicted of several prior drug 
trafficking offenses, Fraction faced an advisory sentencing guideline range of 151 to 188 
months of imprisonment.  The District Court varied downward, sentencing him to 120 
months of imprisonment.     
 In December 2020, Fraction filed a pro se motion for compassionate release (ECF 
672), which he later supplemented with two addendums (ECF 675 and 679) and a letter 
from his wife (ECF 678).  He argued that the District Court should order his immediate 
release because of the threat posed by COVID-19.  He claimed that numerous inmates at 
FCI-Allenwood had tested positive for the virus, that those inmates were “not getting the 
proper medical attention needed,” and that, following a 20-day quarantine in the special 
housing unit, he was going to be returned to the unit that housed the inmates who had 
contracted the virus.  Furthermore, Fraction alleged that he is at risk of serious illness if 
he contracted COVID-19 because he is obese.  Fraction also claimed that he is not a 
danger to the community because he “changed in the way that I view life.”    
 
 
The District Court denied the compassionate release motion, holding, among other 
things, the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighed against any reduction in 
his sentence.  (ECF 681.)  Fraction appealed. (687.)  In this Court, Fraction has a motion 
for appointment of counsel (Doc. 7) and his opening brief (Doc. 10).  The Government 
has moved for summary affirmance (Doc. 8).   
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review for abuse of discretion 
the denial of an eligible defendant’s motion for a sentence modification under § 3582(c).  
See United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020).  Thus, we “will not 
disturb the District Court’s decision unless there is a definite and firm conviction that it 
committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the 
relevant factors.”  Id. (alteration, quotation marks, and citation omitted).  We may affirm 
on any basis supported by the record.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 
2011) (per curiam).  
The compassionate release provision states that a district court “may reduce the 
term of imprisonment” and “impose a term of probation or supervised release” if it finds 
that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).  Before granting compassionate release, a district court must consider 
“the factors set forth in § 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.”  § 3582(c)(1)(A).  
Those factors include, among other things, “the nature and circumstances of the offense 
and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” § 3553(a)(1), and the need for the 
sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to 
 
 
provide just punishment for the offense”; “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal 
conduct”; and “to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,” 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C).   
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Fraction’s 
compassionate release motion because the applicable § 3553(a) factors do not support 
relief.  Fraction’s offense was serious.  He distributed between 100 and 200 grams of 
cocaine over a period of almost two years.  In addition, he qualified as a career offender 
based on his extensive criminal history.  Moreover, Fraction’s sentence already included 
a significant downward variance from the guidelines range.  See United States v. Ruffin, 
978 F.3d 1000, 1008 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting that sentence reduction was not warranted 
where, among other factors, “the court had already varied downward by five years from 
Ruffin’s guidelines range when imposing [a] lengthy sentence”).  Finally, as the District 
Court noted, because Fraction had served approximately only 40% of his sentence, the 
“need to serve additional prison time to deter him from continuing a life of crime based 
upon his history of disrespect for the law” weighed against relief.  (ECF 681, at 4); 
Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at 331 (stating that “the time remaining in [the] sentence may—
along with the circumstances underlying the motion for compassionate release and the 
need to avoid unwarranted disparities among similarly situated inmates—inform whether 
immediate release would be consistent with” the § 3553(a) factors).  These circumstances 
fail to lead us to “a definite and firm conviction that [the District Court] committed a 
clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant 
 
 
factors.”  Id. at 330 (alteration omitted) (quoting Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 
146 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the Government’s motion and will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s judgment.1 
 
1 Fraction’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.   
